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executive summary

Executive Summary
background
While the number of institutions, policies, and programs charged with stewardship
of the global commons has risen dramatically over the last thirty years, the state of
the global environment continues to show negative trends and increasing risks. In
response, governments, civil society leaders, and policy experts have called for
stronger governance of the global commons by transforming the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) into a more powerful global environmental
organization. Any reform initiative should begin, however, with a review of the
existing global environmental regime. This report assesses UNEP’s performance in
the context of international environmental governance with regard to three core
functions: 1) monitoring, assessment, and reporting on the state of the global
environment; 2) setting an agenda for action and managing the process of
establishing standards, policies, and guidelines; and 3) developing institutional
capacity to address existing and emerging problems.

findings
UNEP has a clear mandate to serve as the leading or “anchor” institution for the
global environment, but has done so with only partial success. It has been relatively
effective in two key areas – (1) monitoring and assessment and (2) launching
environmental agreements. It has also served as the main policy forum for
environment ministries from around the world and helped build their institutional
capacity. However, UNEP has fallen short in managing policy processes in a coherent
and coordinated fashion, has failed to provide an ability to benchmark performance
and identify “best practices,” and has not established itself as the institutional home
for the numerous international environmental conventions. Without a center of
gravity, the system of international environmental governance has grown
increasingly complex and fragmented.
At the core of this dynamic lies a key set of structural shortcomings. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, UNEP was not constructed to be a weak and ineffective institu
tion, but rather was expected to grow into its mandate as it proved its effectiveness.
Four structural features instituted with the best intentions at the time of UNEP’s
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creation have instead inhibited its performance and growth. First, UNEP’s authority has
been severely constrained by its status within the UN system as a Programme rather
than a Specialized Agency. Second, because of UNEP’s governance structure, more
attention has been paid to the needs and demands of member states than to the overall
mission of the organization. Third, UNEP’s ﬁnancial structure has enabled countries to
pursue their own agendas by using UNEP to advance their pet issues, rather than
ﬁnancing activities for the common good. Fourth, UNEP’s physical distance from the
centers of political activity has negatively affected its capacity to coordinate numerous
environment-related agencies as well as, most importantly, its ability to attract top-tier
policy staff. As a consequence of its many structural limitations, UNEP has been unable
to articulate a long-term institutional vision to guide its strategy.

recommendations
UNEP’s role as a strong global voice and conscience for the environment has remained
largely unfulﬁlled. UNEP, however, offers a potentially strong comparative advantage
in environmental monitoring, assessment, and information-sharing and is the natural
forum for the creation of a coherent international system in this area. UNEP could also
lay the foundation for a policy forum that convenes various clusters of agencies and
networks to negotiate and exchange experience. Its leadership position within the
Environmental Management Group could grant it the policy space for such an
initiative. UNEP has undertaken many projects to support national environmental
efforts and has developed an understanding of key needs around the world. A more
strategic, prioritized, and long-term capacity development approach could facilitate
implementation of major agreements by drawing on UNEP’s work as an information
clearinghouse and a policy forum, rather than as an operational agency.
This report offers recommendations to the United Nations Secretary-General,
national governments, UNEP, and international organizations and civil society
responsible for the stewardship of the global environment, summarized below.

recommendations
United Nations Secretary-General
●

Launch a comprehensive assessment of the global environmental gover
nance system
Governments

●

●

●

Create a global environmental
information clearinghouse within
UNEP
Create a global environmental
capacity clearinghouse
Cluster institutions

UNEP
●

●

●

Initiate an independent
strategic review
Consolidate ﬁnancial
accounting and reporting
Restructure organizational
governance
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the recommendations in more detail
1.

Initiate an assessment of global environmental governance to clarify the mandates
of the numerous existing organizations, elaborate a substantive vision, identify pri
ority issues to be addressed, and outline ways for implementation. Such an assess
ment could provide a replicable template for similar evaluations of lead institutions
in other global public goods domains and lay a solid foundation for UN reform.

2.

Create an information clearinghouse to provide a comprehensive and consoli
dated information source with comparable data on environmental issues, trends,
policy results, and risks around the globe. The clearinghouse could build on
UNEP’s comparative advantage in environmental monitoring, assessment, and
information exchange.

3.

Create a capacity clearinghouse to track and plan technical assistance activities,
match the “supply” and “demand” of services, and highlight best practices on a wide
range of projects. This institutional mechanism should be established drawing on
the comparative strengths of both operational (UNDP and the World Bank) and
normative (UNEP) agencies, as well as on the expertise and resources of the GEF.

4. Cluster institutions to combine efforts of agencies on individual issues according
to their comparative advantage. One approach would entail a different agency
taking the lead in a certain issue area, leading to the formation of clusters around
biodiversity, climate change, ﬁsheries, desertiﬁcation, and other existing and
emerging issues. The Environmental Management Group – the interagency
coordination mechanism for the United Nations created in 1999 – could be
transformed into a useful platform for the coordination of such efforts.
5.

Initiate a strategic review of UNEP to compare actual performance to expected
results, verify key constraints and opportunities, and identify ways to measure
impact. An independent review would help collate reports on the status of
reform efforts, prioritize short- and long-term goals, and establish time frames to
complete reforms.

6. Consolidate ﬁnancial accounting and reporting within UNEP to classify expendi
tures in terms of mandated functions or by environmental issue. Through more
coherent ﬁnancial reporting, UNEP could better build and maintain the conﬁ
dence of its donors.
7.

Restructure UNEP’s organizational governance to ensure effective prioritization
of global environmental needs and effective internal management. An inclusive
body like the Global Ministerial Environment Forum created in 1999 and com
prising all environmental ministers from around the world (as opposed to the
58-member UNEP Governing Council) and a smaller, more efﬁcient Executive
Board would better serve these two separate functions. A focus on strengthen
ing the organization’s decisionmaking procedures – and adapting cutting-edge
standards of “good governance” – would also build UNEP’s legitimacy and add
to its authority.
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Introduction
“It is the state of the environment that tells us whether our
policies and programmes are effective.”
Klaus Töpfer, Executive Director, UN Environment Programme1

While the number of institutions, policies, and programs charged with stewardship
of the global commons has risen dramatically over the last thirty years, the state of
the global environment continues to show negative trends and increasing risks.2 As a
result, national governments, civil society groups, and experts on global environment
policy have called for strengthening the global environmental governance system3
and, in turn, transforming the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
into a more powerful global environmental organization. A recent proposal by the
French and German governments to establish a UN Environment Organization
(UNEO), for example, has gained considerable attention and has emerged as a serious political option for reforming the current system.4

1

2

3

4

Institutional reform must ultimately be rooted in an understanding of
where the global environmental governance system has succeeded, where
it has failed, why that has been the case, and what the leverage points are
to encourage better effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. The story of UNEP
holds valuable lessons for any reform initiative.
UNEP was established in 1972 in response to a common understanding that “the
work in the ﬁeld of environment needed a common outlook and direction”5 and that
it was necessary to create “a central co-coordinating mechanism in the United
Nations to provide political and conceptual leadership, to contemplate methods of
avoiding or reducing global environmental risks, of working out joint norms, and of
avoiding or settling conﬂicts between states on environmental matters. Such a mech
anism should be given enough authority and resources to ensure effective co-ordina
tion of ongoing and planned activities.”6
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Töpfer 2002.

Speth 2004.

Comprehensive reviews of
global environmental gover
nance include: Desai 2004;
Esty and Ivanova 2002b; Kanie
and Haas 2004; Speth 2003,
2004; Vogler and Imber 1996.

See Ministry of Foreign Affairs
– France 2005 and Tarasofsky
and Hoare 2004.

Rydbeck 1972.

Ibid.
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The anchor institution termi
nology builds on a concept
advanced by Alex Shakow
(Shakow 2004). The definition
of main functions also draws
on the analysis of the out
comes of the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration in terms of key
functions of the central inter
national environment organi
zation and on more recent
works on this topic. See Head
1978; Haas et al 1993; Esty and
Ivanova 2002a.

8

9

For proposals for a World
Environmental Organization
(WEO), see Biermann 2000,
2001, 2002a, 2002b; Biermann
and Bauer 2004, 2005;
Charnovitz 2002. For a Global
Environment Organization
(GEO) see Esty 1994, 2000;
Runge 2001; Ruggiero 1998.
For a Global Environmental
Mechanism (GEM) see Esty
and Ivanova 2002a.
Najam 2001.

10 Imber 1993 cited in
Najam2003.
11 Conca 1995 cited in Najam
2003.
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von Moltke 1996.
Haas 2004.
Ibid.
Speth 2002.
von Moltke 1996.
United Nations 1997.
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UNEP was thus created as the core, or anchor institution, for the global environ
ment to gather and transmit information, catalyze action, and coordinate environ
mental activities within the UN system. Anchor institutions are the primary, though
not the only, international organizations in a global issue area and typically perform
three main functions:7 1) overseeing monitoring, assessment, and reporting on the
state of the issue in their purview; 2) setting an agenda for action and managing the
process of determining standards, policies, and guidelines; and 3) developing institu
tional capacity to address existing and emerging problems. Anchor institutions deﬁne
problems, develop new policy ideas and programs, manage crises, and set priorities
for shared activities that would not exist otherwise.
Contemporary reform initiatives for environmental governance fall into two cat
egories: (1) those that take UNEP as a departure point for system-wide reform, such
as the UNEO initiative proposing that UNEP be upgraded into a specialized agency
and (2) those that advance a radical system overhaul, like the proposals for a WEO
(World Environment Organization), GEO (Global Environmental Organization),
and GEM (Global Environmental Mechanism).8

While the institutional landscape for environmental governance is indeed
cluttered and fragmented, it is imperative to begin any reform initiative
with a sound overview of institutional accomplishments, challenges, and
constraints.
The objective of this report is to assess UNEP’s performance and to identify key fac
tors that have shaped its performance over the past thirty years. Analysts of UNEP offer
a wide range of opinions regarding the effectiveness of the organization, yet few of
these statements are grounded in empirical evidence, as no systematic assessment of
UNEP’s performance has been carried out to date. UNEP is considered by some as
“one of the most impressive UN organizations in terms of its actual achievements,”9
“generally well-regarded,”10 “relatively effective,”11 and “given its mandate, its resources,
and its authority . . . a remarkable success.”12 It is also characterized as “relatively obso
lete, eclipsed in resources and prestige,”13 “under-funded, over-loaded and remote,”14 a
“peanut-sized”15 “weak agency”16 with “wasted scarce resources [and] a credibility
gap.”17 However, lacking a systematic evaluation of UNEP’s effectiveness, recommen
dations for institutional reform will remain inadequate and even misguided.
This report attempts to evaluate UNEP’s performance more systematically by
examining its three core functions of an anchor institution – monitoring and assess
ment; agenda setting and policy processes; and capacity development. The report
identiﬁes four key factors that have limited UNEP’s ability to fulﬁll its mandate: for
mal status, governance, ﬁnancing structure, and location. Because many of the
underlying factors are products of decisions made in 1972, the study provides a his
torical context and gleans lessons for the architects of the environmental governance

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

introduction

13

system for the 21st century. The report also outlines institutional options and advances
a set of concrete and operational recommendations for UNEP, as well as for govern
ments.

methodology
This study does not aim to cover UNEP’s performance in all of its mandate functions,
nor does it intend to assess the effectiveness of UNEP in speciﬁc programs and proj
ects. Rather, it seeks to assess UNEP’s existing role and future potential as an anchor
institution for the global environment.
The methodology centers on a two-fold approach: 1) empirical analysis, including
original surveys, research, and interviews, and 2) desk review, including examination
of both primary and secondary literature. The results of the analysis were presented
in February 2005 to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in Washington, DC,
and during the 23rd session of the UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial
Environment Forum in Nairobi, Kenya.
The original empirical work was undertaken in the fall of 2004 as part of a gradu
ate course at the School of Forestry & Environmental Studies at Yale University developed and co-taught by the author. Student teams worked for a three-month period
in 2004 on the four key functions in UNEP’s mandate: 1) monitoring, assessment, and
information provision, 2) coordination of the environmental activities in the UN system, 3) capacity building and technical support, and 4) catalyzing environmental
action. Three additional teams analyzed UNEP’s governance, ﬁnancing, and human
resources.
Two online surveys were developed and executed in December 2004: 1) on UNEP’s
performance in its information and assessment functions and 2) on its internal oper
ations. The information survey aimed to ascertain UNEP’s challenges and successes
unavailable through existing published literature. It was distributed to 85 environment ministers and 65 staff at NGOs, international organizations, and Global
Environmental Outlook collaborating centers, generating an 18% response rate.18 The
internal operations survey aimed to obtain demographic information on the staff of
the organization, the organizational culture, and the implications for UNEP’s per
formance. The survey was distributed to all UNEP professional staff, generating a
38% response rate from UNEP Headquarters in Nairobi.19
Over 100 interviews were conducted in person, via telephone, or via e-mail with
current and former UNEP staff, international environmental policy experts from aca
demia, government, non-governmental organizations, international organizations
(World Bank, WHO, WTO, ILO, UNESCO, GEF), as well as political advisors and
independent consultants. All interviews will remain anonymous.
Recommendations advanced in this report are based on the analysis of the Yale
class, discussions with numerous interviewees, and feedback from participants at the
Yale presentations in Washington and Nairobi; however, they ultimately reﬂect the
opinions of the author.
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These two groups were tar
geted as the primary audi
ences of UNEP’s scientific
assessments and information.
Questions focused on UNEP’s
strengths and weaknesses as
an information source, effectiveness of information outreach, and priorities for
improving monitoring,
assessment, and information
provision. Although the
response rate partially hin
ders the ability to gain a com
prehensive sample of opin
ions about the information
function, the Yale survey
response rate is similar to the
20% return rate to UNEP’s
own efforts at evaluating the
impact of the Global
Environmental Outlook report
on its audience. UNEP 2004b.

The overall response rate was
20% and the response rate of
the various offices contacted
is as follows: 38% in Nairobi;
9% in Geneva; 17% in
Washington ; 5% in Paris;
60% in New York; and 11% in
the Hague. There are several
UNEP offices with a very
small number of staff which
did not respond.
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Monitoring and Assessment
UNEP was established to “keep under review the world environmental situation” and
“promote the contribution of the relevant international scientiﬁc and other professional communities to the acquisition, assessment, and exchange of environmental
knowledge and information.”20 In the area of monitoring and assessment, UNEP is
expected to “provide policy advice, early warning information on environmental
threats, and to catalyze and promote international cooperation and action, based on
the best scientiﬁc and technical capabilities available.”21

20

21

22

Figure 1 Total Annual UNEP Publications

22

United Nations 1972a [here
inafter G.A. Resolution 2997].

UNEP 1997b [hereinafter
Nairobi Declaration].

Analysis by Yale research
team using data from the
United Nations Bibliographic
Information System.
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Unlike the WMO or WHO in their respective ﬁelds, UNEP does not perform any
direct monitoring and surveillance of its own. Rather, it collects, collates, analyzes,
and integrates data from UN agencies and other organizations – including convention secretariats, universities, science institutes, and NGOs – to form broader environmental assessments.23
yale school of forestry & environmental studies

A coordinated global network
of collaborating centers con
tributes to the GEO process,
where top-down integrated
assessment is continuously
combined with bottom-up
environmental reporting
inputs. A significant amount
of analysis of spatial and statistical data comes from
GRID, within UNEP. Other
data centers like GEMS-Water
and WCMC work very closely
with governments and other
scientific institutions to col
lect necessary data.
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UNEP’s assessments are highly recognized in the field and have served not
only as tools for environmental information but also as tools for capacity
building within collaborating centers around the world. In order to serve as
the anchor institution for the environment in monitoring and assessment,
however, UNEP will need to focus more resources into addressing several
key challenges. Data comparability, information quality and coherence, and
UNEP’s internal capacity need to be enhanced along with the capacity for
data collection and analysis in the developing world.

unep’s global environment assessment authority
24

25

26

27

28

29

Haas 2004.

See UNEP 2004a [hereinafter
SWOT Analysis], and UNEP
2004b citing a producer of a
six-part BBC world service
radio program based on
GEO-2000.

UNEP 2005d, p.12.

Yale research team.

UNEP 2004a.

It is important to note, how
ever, that these are selfreported trends. A more
accurate measure of
enhanced credibility and rep
utation would be through a
survey of change in percep
tion by organizations work
ing with the UNEP
Collaborating Centers.

UNEP is considered relatively effective in its assessment of global environmental
issues.24 Its ﬂagship environmental assessment publication – the Global Environ
mental Outlook (GEO) – has been noted as “one of the two most respected environ
mental outlook publications currently available.”25 The GEO process has become an
important model for developing and improving the scientiﬁc credibility, political rel
evance, and legitimacy of UNEP’s assessment function.26 GEO utilizes an approach
based on collaboration, involving universities, research centers, international insti
tutes, and NGOs in 30 countries representing regions around the world. It also
employs a periodic review process through an online user survey soliciting external
feedback and an informal, self-reﬂective internal review.
This comprehensive global state of the environment report has been widely cited
as useful for identifying major emerging environmental issues and for placing nation
al issues in a broader perspective, raising the awareness of policy makers, scientists
and the general public of the large-scale processes and trends of the global environ
ment.
The GEO process’ most important contributions have been in inﬂuencing policy
formulation, catalyzing action, and developing institutional capacity. Regional gov
ernmental forums and national governments have adopted GEO methodology for the
production and/or improvement of their State of the Environment reporting. In
countries where no such reporting was carried out (for example, Cuba, Peru, Costa
Rica, Barbados, Gabon, Senegal, Congo, Ghana, and Cameroon among others28), the
GEO process has catalyzed national State of the Environment reports (see Map 1).
Several collaborating centers reported that participation in the GEO process has led
to an improvement in the quality of products and services offered, increased satisfac
tion among center stakeholders, and enhanced credibility and reputation.29 In some
centers, it has also helped to attract additional staff and to develop new skills and
knowledge for staff members. Map 1 shows the geographic spread of GEO
Collaborating Centers and UNEP catalyzed initiatives in monitoring and assessment.
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Map 1 GEO Collaborating Centers and UNEP Catalyzed Initiatives

30

UNEP HQ

Selected UNEP
Catalyzed Initiatives

UNEP 2004a; Yale research
team.

GEO Collaborating Centers

One of GEO’s key limitations is the lack of comparative data across countries. While
the report provides comprehensive information by issue and broad geographic area,
it does not show the comparative performance of countries around the world in
addressing environmental challenges. The data, therefore, are not utilized to their full
capacity for informing policy decisions. It is through comparison across jurisdictions
that progress is encouraged both among the leaders and the laggards. Box 1 (next
page) illustrates recent efforts at developing environmental sustainability indicators.
Box 1 Comparative Environmental Data

The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), developed by the Yale Center
for Environmental Law and Policy and the Center for International Earth
Science Information Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University, bench
marks the ability of nations to protect the environment.31 With 76 data sets
compiled into 21 indicators, the ESI ranks 146 countries from best to worst
environmental performance, permitting comparison across a range of issues.
Measuring environmental quality in absolute terms is arguably impossible
and remains elusive. However, relative measures are achievable. National
governments are ﬁnding it useful and instructive to compare their performance to that of others who are similarly situated. Identifying leaders and lag
gards puts pressure on underperforming countries to improve results. No
country scores very high or very low on all indicators. Therefore, “every society has something to learn from benchmarking its environmental performance against relevant peer countries.”32
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See http://www.yale.edu/esi.
The ESI has received interna
tional attention as the leading measure of environmental sustainability, with more
than 1 million website hits for
the 2005 ESI Report. Accessed
August 2005.

Esty, Levy, Srebotnjak, and de
Sherbinin 2005, p.2.
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strategic challenges and improvements

33

34

35

UNEP 2005d, p.10. An exam
ple cited by governments in
the report is in the area of
health and the environment,
in which various United
Nations institutions and
other organizations are
active and potentially dupli
cating efforts.

UNEP 2004a, p.13.

UNEP 2004a, p.23.

UNEP is the natural forum for the creation of a coherent international system for
environmental information and assessment. It offers the advantage of building on an
existing institution with a clear mandate to serve as an information clearinghouse
and a relatively strong scientiﬁc track record. While the GEO process and its outputs
are notable, a number of strategic challenges remain in the monitoring and
assessment of global environmental conditions. On a broader level, fragmentation
and the resulting duplication among the various monitoring and assessment
activities within UNEP have prevented it from becoming the anchor institution for
the environment within the international system. Within UNEP, activities regarding
information and scientiﬁc assessment are spread across all eight divisions of the
organization. Collection, processing, and dissemination of information are further
allocated to a number of other UNEP-operated global scientiﬁc data centers. The
problem is compounded at the international level where duplication of
environmental assessments performed by other UN agencies and NGOs runs
rampant. Stakeholders recognize this as a serious problem,33 yet little is done to
address the reasons for the failure to effectively coordinate activities or to formulate
concrete strategies to overcome existing constraints.

Collaboration and coordination do not just happen. They have to be encour
aged, facilitated, and sustained. This requires a fundamentally different sys
tem of incentives for international organizations and governments, where
long-term vision and strategy are rewarded over narrowly focused projects
with immediate outputs.
On a more speciﬁc level, UNEP should focus on improving the quality of both
incoming and outgoing information. Inconsistent use of scientiﬁc quality assurance
and quality control protocols in information and data management lead to unreliable
output quality and relevance.34 Missing data limit UNEP’s ability to compile compre
hensive international environmental assessments, draw conclusions, and make scien
tiﬁcally-based policy recommendations. They also impair the credibility of UNEP’s
work in the eyes of users.35
In the GEO process, these problems are to a great extent due to the lack of sufﬁ
cient capacity and to resource constraints both within UNEP and at country level
where data collection and analysis are performed. Methodological issues related to
data management and analysis, indicator development, and integrated policy analy
sis have further hampered information quality. Addressing many of today’s pressing
environmental issues requires the integration of socio-economic factors with more
traditional environmental science data, thus creating a demand for a more compre
hensive approach and extensive institutional capacity in both the contributing and
receiving organizations.
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In the same vein, environmental information coming out of UNEP needs to be con
siderably improved in terms of coherence and accessibility. Currently, information is
scattered and disorganized. The public cannot use UNEP’s publications and beneﬁt
from the organization’s work to the fullest extent due to the lack of a single easily
accessible, searchable, and sortable database or catalog of publications. For example, a
user seeking information from UNEP on a single topic would have to search nine pub
lication catalogs and the online UN database just to ﬁnd everything published between
1990 and 2000. These catalogs are repetitive, incomplete, and often unclear. Existing
databases, such as GRID, WCMC, and UNEP.net, are rife with data holes and incon
sistencies.36 UNEP’s current capacity is not adequate to perform the function of a
coherent clearinghouse for environmental information, highlighting “best practices”
and promoting “information sharing” among countries. Signiﬁcant institutional
investment will be required to enhance this core function for UNEP.
Throughout all levels of its monitoring and assessment function, UNEP will also
need to increase its own capacities in expertise, resources, and ﬂexibility in order to
effectively perform a collaborative and coordinated assessment process. Its current
institutional capacity for monitoring and assessment requires considerable enhancement for the organization to fulﬁll its anchor role.37 To secure this leading role in envi
ronmental science, information, and monitoring, UNEP will need to signiﬁcantly
improve its capacity for collection and analysis of comparative data, better leverage
its large number of collaborating organizations, and raise the priority of this function
within the organization.
Most importantly, UNEP needs to attract the most qualiﬁed scientiﬁc experts in
the key environmental issue areas – water, air, climate, biodiversity, forestry, and
desertiﬁcation – as well as a number of policy staff in order to explicitly strengthen
the linkages between environmental trends and policy options. The GEO team at
Headquarters, for example, comprises only three professional staff, whose expertise
cannot cover the full range of environmental and technical issues. A team of highly
qualiﬁed technical experts is also urgently needed to develop, design, and maintain
the data portals and websites. Attracting high quality staff and investing in program
activities would require at least a doubling of DEWA’s annual budget of $US16 mil
lion.38 Currently, with 76% of the funds spent on staff salaries,39 little is left for programmatic activities.

When UNEP’s work becomes the standard for quality, relevance, timeliness,
and accessibility in the environmental field, the organization will have
begun to serve as the anchor institution for the global commons. This, however, will require targeted and stable investment both from UNEP and from
governments.
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Agenda Setting and Managing Policy
Processes
Another important function critical to an anchor institution is agenda setting and
management of intergovernmental processes to address key issues and to gain agree
ment on standards, policies, and guidelines.

Setting goals and priorities and coordinating efforts for their attainment
have been problematic for UNEP.40
In some cases, such as the protection of the ozone layer, UNEP has initiated mul
tilateral environmental agreements that have led to standards, policies, and guidelines
for the stewardship of the global environment. But on other critical issues, notably
climate change, UNEP has played a backseat role. With the increasing number of
treaties and institutions responsible for their administration, coordination of over
lapping efforts has emerged as an issue of paramount importance. UNEP has not suc
ceeded in becoming the central forum for debate and deliberation in the environ
mental ﬁeld, like the WTO for trade or the WHO for health. A complex and cross
cutting issue, the environment may indeed be difﬁcult to encompass within one
organization. The fragmentation of policy processes, however, has had a largely detri
mental impact on the effectiveness of global environmental governance.41
UNEP was designed as an advocacy organization at the international level. It was
expected to be proactive and set the global agenda by identifying emerging concerns
and galvanizing action around them from governments, international organizations,
NGOs, and business. UNEP’s original mandate calls on its Secretariat “[t]o submit to
the Governing Council, on its own initiative or upon request, proposals embodying
medium-range planning for United Nations programs in the field of the
environment.”42
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UNEP’s visionary capacity was seriously damaged during and after the Rio
Earth Summit as the organization lost its leading role in the environmental
field.The creation of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Commission
for Sustainable Development (CSD) detracted from UNEP’s authority as an
anchor institution, through financial superiority in the case of the GEF and con
vening power in a key location (New York City) in the case of the CSD.43
In fact, GEF has become the major ﬁnancing instrument for projects on the glob
al environment and, until the establishment of the Global Ministerial Environment
Forum in 1999, the CSD was the major forum for environmental ministers around
the world. The environmental debate was thus taking place in New York at the CSD
and in the Second Committee of the UN General Assembly rather than in Nairobi at
UNEP Headquarters.44
UNEP’s attempts to cover a vast number of priorities, often under pressure from
governments, and its risk-averse attitude have prevented it from establishing a solid
brand name that would give it the freedom to act as a leader by setting the global
environmental agenda and taking action to attain it. Rather, it has been continuously
challenged in its leadership position, as noted in an internal evaluation by the United
Nations Ofﬁce for Internal Oversight Services:
The basic issue facing UNEP is the clariﬁcation of its role . . . It is not clear
to staff or to stakeholders what that role should be. The lack of clarity has
had consequences for how programmes have been conceived and managed,
for the ongoing downsizing of programmes and for staff morale and esprit
de corps. Management’s ﬁrst responsibility should be to focus on this new
role, anchoring it to fewer priorities so as to increase the organization’s effec
tiveness and its potential for impact.45
Although considerable improvements have been initiated in the last few years, a
sense of prioritization is still lacking.46 UNEP’s planning process is in many ways
driven by the inﬂuence of individual states asserting their own priorities. The orga
nization’s dependence on voluntary contributions creates governance challenges, par
ticularly with respect to the establishment of priorities, allocation of resources, and
execution of programs.
Furthermore, governing bodies ﬁnd it relatively easy to add new programs and
activities but ﬁnd it very difﬁcult to achieve consensus on what to stop doing. This
can lead to signiﬁcant pressure on the Secretariat, which is faced with increasing
demands and often decreasing resources.47 For example, in the area of capacity build
ing, no core set of priorities has been established leading to excessive demands from
national governments on UNEP’s own capacity to deliver. The result has been the
proliferation of projects with no overall strategic vision or coherent action plan.
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Thus far, UNEP has not successfully deﬁned its long-term goals, which limits its
ability to set the global environmental agenda. The organization does not have a work
plan beyond the next two-year planning cycle, which prevents it from taking on chal
lenges that demand extended commitments to action. UNEP does not regularly
undertake comprehensive strategic planning, a standard practice for other interna
tional organizations and companies. Instead, longer-term strategies are developed in
an ad-hoc manner, elaborated only for in-house brainstorming and guidance.

UNEP’s failure to articulate a vision for the future of global environmental
governance inhibits its ability to attract both financial and political support
for the organization’s agenda.
The existence of a clear and coherent institutional vision and long-term planning
has enabled other international organizations to serve as stronger anchor institutions
in their ﬁelds. The WHO, for example, has been able to reject funds that do not
advance its long-term strategic vision and instead focus government contributions on
a set of key priorities. Without a long-term strategy for accomplishing goals, it is difﬁcult to raise the necessary funds. The withdrawal of ﬁnancial support from UNEP
after the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 is to a great extent due to the organization’s inability to carve out a prominent role within the new institutional landscape. As the Ofﬁce
for Internal and Oversight Services observed in 1997, a vicious circle of limited funds
and limited effectiveness had deterred UNEP from enlarging its visionary capacity
and raising the necessary resources throughout much of its existence.48
UNEP’s anchor role demands that it serve as the center of gravity in a complex system of international environmental governance. Resolution 2997 clearly outlined
UNEP’s coordination function to “provide general policy guidance for the direction
and co-ordination of environmental programmes within the United Nations system,”49 and endowed the organization with speciﬁc institutional mechanisms by
establishing an Environment Co-ordination Board.50 Constrained by its relatively
lower-rank status within the UN system, its limited ﬁnancial and human resources,
and its geographical remoteness, however, UNEP has not been able to fulﬁll its coordination mandate effectively.

Coordination of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and coordi
nation of the environmental activities of other international organizations
has been a “mission impossible.”51
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In the last thirty years, UNEP has played a highly-regarded lead role in establish
ing an extensive system of international environmental law52 through the creation of
environmental conventions (also known as multilateral environmental agreements –
MEAs), assistance to developing countries in creating environmental law, and softlaw guidelines for a wide range of sectors. Once launched, however, the conventions
have become autonomous entities, each with its own Conference of the Parties,
Secretariat, and associated subsidiary bodies that have autonomous inﬂuence often
exceeding that of UNEP.
Despite the successful creation of international agreements, “the ﬂourishing of new
international institutions poses problems of coordination, eroding responsibilities
and resulting in duplication of work as well as increased demand upon ministries and
government.”53 UNEP has undertaken efforts at greater coherence and coordination of
the numerous MEAs but with limited success.54 For example, UNEP initiated a process
of harmonization of reporting requirements for the ﬁve biodiversity related conven
tions (Convention on Biological Diversity, CITES, Convention on Migratory Species,
the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, and the World Heritage Convention) and the
two regional seas conventions with biodiversity related protocols (Barcelona and the
Cartagena Conventions). While a common website and a biodiversity clearinghouse
mechanism have been established, there has been little substantive progress toward
the practical implementation of a common reporting framework.
Figure 3 Timeline of Major Multilateral Environmental Agreements Catalyzed by UNEP
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Coordination among the conventions has been difﬁcult, if not impossible, as
UNEP has little if any formal authority over them and is geographically far removed
from their independent secretariats.55 No incentives exist for integrated activities
between the conventions and UNEP. Efforts have been “piecemeal rather than the
result of a deliberate, overarching strategic choice”56 and, as one convention secre
tariat put it, “considerable lip service is paid to the synergies paradigm but, when it
comes to implementation, each convention continues to be inward-looking and
afraid of sharing or giving away part of their sovereignty.”57
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Furthermore, UNEP’s ability to lead coordination activities has been severely lim
ited by its lack of formal authority over the secretariats and Conference(s) of the
Parties. The handful of MEAs that are nested within UNEP have fairly independent
administrative arrangements presenting a serious operational challenge for UNEP’s
coordination role. For example, UNEP staff need to travel on average approximately
3,777 miles from Nairobi to UNEP-hosted convention secretariats. In contrast, other
international organizations, including the International Maritime Organization, the
International Labor Organization, and the UN Economic Commission for Europe,
provide an institutional home for the conventions that have emerged under their
aegis.
Proliferation of agreements with various governing bodies and requirements is
imposing an increasing burden on all countries, but especially so on developing
nations with limited human, institutional, and ﬁnancial capacities. A more coherent
and effective system for the governance of global commons would ensure that devel
oping countries’ priorities – poverty eradication and development – ﬁgure promi
nently within environmental governance. A set of clear and enforceable rules would
also ensure that fairness and equity in terms of beneﬁt and burden sharing are built
in and that decisionmaking is based on democratic principles.

Developing countries stand to benefit most from reform in the current sys
tem for global environmental governance and the move toward a more
coherent and rule-based institutional structure.
Coordination of the environmental activities of international organizations has
posed a signiﬁcant challenge to UNEP as an anchor institution for a number of
reasons.
First, the explosion in the number of international organizations has overwhelmed
the series of UNEP-driven coordination bodies and mechanisms, which have yielded
few results.58 As often pointed out by UN ofﬁcials, “Everyone wants to coordinate but
no one wants to be coordinated.”
Second, other UN bodies have refused to accept UNEP’s mandate to coordinate all
environmental activities in the UN system due to “institutional seniority.” A number
of UN agencies (ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, WMO, IMCO, IAEA, ICAO, and UNDP)
possessed environmental responsibilities before UNEP was created and thus feel less
of a need to defer to UNEP.
Third, the fear of losing certain parts of one’s work program, budget, and staff if
duplication were eliminated leads agencies to jealously guard their “sovereignty”
without a view of the broader public good.
Fourth, UNEP’s approach to coordination was perceived as controlling and
threatening. For example, UNEP’s earliest heavy-handed attempts (mid-to-late 1970s)
at coordination drove the WMO to send out a memo warning others of “this upstart
agency’s plans to take over everyone’s work.” This has led to strained relations and
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turf wars among the agencies, compromising UNEP’s role as an anchor institution
with the mandate to manage broader policy processes. Subsequently, “UNEP could
no more be expected to ‘coordinate’ the system-wide activities of the UN than could
a medieval monarch ‘coordinate’ his feudal barons.”59 The ultimate result has been
proliferation of institutional arrangements, meetings and agendas. These “substantial
overlaps, unrecognized linkages and gaps”60 have hampered policy coherence and
synergy, amplifying the negative impact of already limited resources.61
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Capacity Development
UNEP has begun to reinvent its work programs to appeal to donors and recipients
alike by putting a new emphasis on capacity development initiatives. Although
UNEP’s mandate clearly prescribes that its core strategies be normative and catalytic,
the organization now views implementation as its primary strategy.62 However, by
shifting from a normative and catalytic function to an implementation and opera
tional role, UNEP has moved from being proactive to being reactive. The focus on
implementation – while critical and necessary – has put the emphasis on reacting to
speciﬁc country needs and circumstances.

With a small staff and minimal resources, UNEP is no match for agencies
like UNDP or the World Bank. With field offices in every country around the
world, annual budgets in the billions, and a strong reputation, it is UNDP
and the World Bank that set the agenda, locally as well as globally. UNEP
cannot and should not function as a full-fledged operational agency. The
institutional space is filled and UNEP does not have the capacity for such a
role. However, a purely normative role is also insufficient and even unnec
essary, as concrete results are increasingly needed. The pressures to continue
moving in a more operational direction will continue to grow.
There is an overall “treaty fatigue” among governments and increasing calls for
concrete assistance with implementation instead. In particular, developing country
governments now regularly demand ﬁnancial and technical assistance with imple
menting multilateral environmental agreements rather than the development of new
norms or guidelines. In addition, concrete accomplishments on the ground are the
clearest evidence of success, and completed projects have become the hard currency
for governments. It is therefore much easier to mobilize funds for tangible products
than for normative or catalytic activities. Many capacity-building projects are
requested by governments, compelling UNEP to pursue the work although it lacks
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the human and ﬁnancial capacity to do so effectively. Availability of funding from the
GEF to three implementing agencies – the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP – has also
pushed UNEP toward increased operational activities. Since the late 1990s, the GEF
has accounted for the largest increase in UNEP income and the GEF division in
UNEP has developed as an almost autonomous body.63
UNEP recognizes the challenges in ﬁnding a balance between its normative man
date and the operational demands it faces. A High-Level Open-Ended
Intergovernmental Working Group was established in March 2004 to improve
UNEP’s capacity-building efforts, resulting in the adoption of the Bali Strategic Plan
for Technology Support and Capacity Building.64 The Bali Plan aims to strengthen
the capacity of governments to: (1) participate fully in the development of coherent
international environmental policy; (2) comply with international agreements; (3)
achieve their environmental goals and environment-related development goals,
including the Millennium Development Goals; (4) and develop national research,
monitoring, and assessment capacity as well as establish infrastructure for scientiﬁc
analysis and environmental management.65
The essence of the Bali Plan lies in coordination, cooperation, and partnerships.
The strategic premise is that efforts should build on existing institutions and be
“coordinated, linked, and integrated with other sustainable development initiatives
through existing coordination mechanisms.”66 The Plan underlines the need for
improved inter-agency coordination and cooperation based on transparent and reli
able information. It does not, however, clarify the respective roles for UNEP, UNDP,
and the World Bank, which have become more like competitors than partners.
For some, the strategy in the Bali Plan marks the return of an issue-based philos
ophy and a shift from the function-based organizational structure and priorities. For
others, the Bali Plan is the only means to enhance UNEP’s proﬁle and brand name as
the leading organization in the environmental domain. Comprehensive in its nature,
the Plan addresses many of the most important challenges facing UNEP in the core
areas of its mandate. It offers few concrete solutions, however.

UNEP’s role could be envisioned as a two-fold technical cooperation role: it
should supervise, lead, and be responsible for general environmental capac
ity building, in particular in the areas of instruments for environmental
management and implementation of MEAs. In addition, UNEP should act as
the environmental conscience of others, in particular the sister agencies of
the UN system.
UNEP can thus act as an environmental management clearinghouse designed to
collect and disseminate information on best practices, policy successes, and on new
technology and relevant private and intergovernmental partners. This could include
regional training and awareness-raising functions as well.
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The Environmental Management Group (EMG) appears to be the existing coordi
nation mechanism most suitable for building capacity for coordination. Created in
1999 as a UN system-wide mechanism, the EMG convenes various UN agencies, con
vention secretariats, and the Bretton Woods institutions under the chairmanship of
the UNEP Executive Director (see Figure 4).
67
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Figure 4 The Constituency of the United Nations Environmental Management Group
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The goal of the EMG is to “promote inter-linkages, encourage timely and relevant
exchange of data and information on speciﬁc issues and compatibility of different
approaches to ﬁnding solutions to those common problems, and contribute to the
synergy and complementarity among and between activities of its members in the
ﬁeld of environment and human settlements.”68 Its main focus in 2004 was capacity
building with the objective of facilitating information exchange and experiences and
identifying synergies among UN agencies and treaty secretariats. High-level political
commitment, however, has been difﬁcult to attract.
Three core reasons underpin the lack of strong engagement in the work of the
EMG. First, a number of parallel forums exist in the UN system, putting excessive
demands on the time and resources of top management.69 Second, the EMG is still
perceived as an instrument for UNEP’s control rather than as a crosscutting mecha
nism for mutually beneﬁcial collaboration. Third, the severely limited capacity of the
EMG (two professional staff and an annual budget of $0.5 million) prevents the institution from taking bold initiatives and effectively performing coordination activities.
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In the 1970s and ’80s, UNEP devoted 30% of its annual budget to coordinating envi
ronmental activities of other organizations. Currently, the EMG spends over 90% of
its $0.5 million budget on staff salaries and internal operations and no resources
within UNEPs budget are speciﬁcally earmarked for coordination activities. Thus,
EMG is rendered virtually ineffective, although it has the institutional and structural
capacity to serve as the foundation for a clearinghouse mechanism.

Coordination has perennially been the weakest link in UNEP. Any new ini
tiative to improve this area needs to seriously examine the reasons behind
this challenge.
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Through the EMG, UNEP could use its comparative advantage as a normative
agency and serve as an authoritative think tank on various environmental concerns
and capacity development. It could receive direct input from and reach out to inter
national organizations, governments, non-governmental organizations, business, and
citizens. EMG’s location in Geneva presents a signiﬁcant opportunity through formal
and informal communications with 22 international organizations headquartered in
Geneva, including the WTO, ILO, and WHO; treaty secretariats; the missions of
almost all national governments; and the representatives of NGOs and business from
around the world. Notably, Geneva has a higher concentration of developing coun
tries representatives than Nairobi, for example, because of the high density of inter
national agencies.70
In addition, UNEP holds a unique leadership advantage in the system at the
regional level. It is at this level that UNEP can be proactive both in a normative and
in an operational manner. Through its network of established regional ofﬁces, UNEP
can facilitate the adoption of regional norms adapted from global agreements and
serve as a matchmaker between donors and recipients in environmental capacity
building.
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Limiting Factors
Several key factors have limited UNEP’s performance as anchor institution for the
global environment: (1) UNEP’s status as a Programme rather than a Specialized
Agency within the UN system has limited its authority and standing; (2) UNEP’s gov
ernance arrangements, including the Committee of Permanent Representatives and
the Governing Council, have constrained its autonomy and leadership; (3) UNEP’s
ﬁnancing structure has led to complete dependence on voluntary funds resulting in a
high degree of unpredictability and volatility of resources as well as openness to
excessive member state inﬂuence on the organization’s agenda; and ﬁnally (4)
UNEP’s location away from the centers of political activity have hampered its ability
to coordinate the specialized agency, to assert itself as the central actor in global environmental, and to attract and retain the most highly-qualiﬁed policy staff.

71

formal status
In the UN hierarchy, Programmes have the least independence and authority as they
are subsidiary organs of the General Assembly.71 Specialized Agencies, on the other
hand, are separate, autonomous intergovernmental organizations with governing
bodies independent of the UN Secretariat and the General Assembly.72 Besides their
role in elaborating common vision, rules, and standards, they also perform many
operational activities within the particular sector they govern. The vision for UNEP
in 1972, however, was for a new type of governing body.

UNEP was not intentionally constituted as a Programme to diminish its
power. Recognizing the complex nature of environmental issues, governments sought to create a lean, flexible, and agile entity that could pull
together the relevant expertise housed in the various agencies and deploy
it effectively.73
The new entity was expected to grow into its mandate as it proved its effectiveness
and be “essentially ﬂexible and evolutionary so as to permit adaptation to changing
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Organizations in the UN with
Programme or similar Fund
status include the United
Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), Office of
the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF),
United Nations Population
Fund (UNFPA), and World
Food Programme (WFP).
Some of the specialized
agencies include the Food
and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), World Health Organi
zation (WHO), World Meteor
ological Organization (WMO),
International Bank for Recon
struction and Development
(World Bank), International
Maritime Organization (IMO),
UN Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), and UN Industrial
Development Organization
(UNIDO).
Ivanova 2005.
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United Nations 1972b. Even
recently declassified confi
dential materials of the gov
ernment of the United
Kingdom show that while
there was interest in restrict
ing the scope of the Stock
holm Conference and reduc
ing a number of proposals
for action that threatened to
infringe on its domestic deci
sion-making processes,
Britain did not set out to cre
ate a weak environmental
organization. Rather, it
accepted that the time had
come for new institutional
arrangements. In the words
of an official from the
Environment Department, a
“new and expensive interna
tional organisation must be
avoided, but a small effective
central coordinating mecha
nism...would not be welcome
but is probably inevitable”
(cited in Hamer 2002).
United Nations 1972b.
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needs and circumstances.”74 The establishment of UNEP as a specialized agency was
deemed counterproductive, since it would make the environment another “sector”
and marginalize it. As Maurice Strong, the Secretary General of the 1972 Stockholm
Conference, put it, the core functions could “only be performed at the international
level by a body which is not tied to any individual sectoral or operational responsi
bilities and is able to take an objective overall view of the technical and policy impli
cations arising from a variety of multidisciplinary factors.”75 Furthermore, there was
a strong sense of disillusionment with the unwieldy bureaucracy of the UN special
ized agencies. This new body was designed to operate at the core of the UN system –
best accomplished with the status of Programme, rather than Specialized Agency
(which, with their semi-autonomous governing mechanisms, operate on the periph
ery of the UN system).
While not intentionally diminishing UNEP’s power, the decision to constitute it as
a Programme rather than a Specialized Agency has impacted its authority. As a result,
UNEP has not been able to establish the autonomy necessary to become an effective
anchor institution for the global environment. As new institutions sprang up across
various levels of governance and many existing ones added substantial environmen
tal mandates, UNEP could claim little authority over them. For example, the creation
of the Commission on Sustainable Development and the Global Environmental
Facility in the early 1990s marginalized UNEP politically and eclipsed it ﬁnancially.
The increased emphasis on environmental work at the World Bank, while commend
able, also led to overlap with UNEP activities. UNEP was unable to coordinate and
create synergies among the multiple bodies in the environmental arena as its politi
cal power and resources were dwarfed by newer institutions. Thus, while the choice
of organizational form did not seek to incapacitate UNEP, the effect has been largely
negative. As one senior UNEP ofﬁcial exclaimed, UNEP “just does not have a voice in
front of the larger UN agencies.”

governance
Three separate bodies share governance responsibilities for UNEP – the Governing
Council comprised of 58 member states, the Secretariat headed by the Executive
Director, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) comprised of
ambassadors to Kenya serving as Permanent Representatives to UNEP.

UNEP’s governance structure was designed to perform two distinct func
tions: (1) the external functions of advancing international environmental
governance by monitoring global environmental trends, setting a consen
sus global environmental agenda, and establishing global priorities, and (2)
the internal function of overseeing UNEP’s program, budget, and opera
tions. In practice, UNEP’s governance structure conflates these two roles.
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The Governing Council is responsible for both setting the global environmental
agenda and elaborating UNEP’s work program and budget. This leads to overly politi
cized institutional governance and a work program that reﬂects a compilation of indi
vidual states’ interests rather than a focused, strategic vision. It also prevents UNEP
from exercising leadership in international environmental governance more broadly,
as no long-term, bold vision for the system can be elaborated and implemented.
The responsibilities of the Council of Permanent Representatives (CPR) include
reviewing UNEP’s draft program of work and budget, monitoring the implementa
tion of Governing Council decisions, and preparing draft decisions for consideration
by the Council.76 However, more often than not, these representatives have little
knowledge of and expertise in environmental issues and have a number of other
duties in their portfolio.77 The CPR considerably limits the autonomy and power of
the Secretariat in Nairobi either through direct intervention in UNEP’s work (meet
ing four times a year to discuss the work program and budget) or through inﬂuence
on UNEP’s staff, whose loyalties often lie with their national governments.
Advancement within the ranks of national administrations is often contingent on a
good recommendation from the ambassador at one’s duty station, creating pressure
to pursue narrow national interests within the organization.
A further complication is that, while the CPR directly inﬂuences UNEP’s work
through constant oversight of the organization’s operations, the ﬁnal say on decisions
regarding the work program and budget lies not with the CPR, but with the
Governing Council. Meeting once a year in Nairobi, the Governing Council is sup
posed to both craft a visionary agenda for international environmental governance at
the global scale and set the parameters within which UNEP is allowed to operate –
i.e. its biennial program of work and budget. Typically, a person other than the
Permanent Representative represents the country at the Governing Council, often the
environmental minister who ﬂies to Kenya speciﬁcally for the week-long session.
Even though a Permanent Representative to UNEP might have worked on a particu
lar aspect of the work program for months, his or her recommendations and deci
sions could be contested by the national representative under this arrangement.
Unless the CPR’s relationship with the Governing Council is clariﬁed, there will be lit
tle room for substantially improving UNEP’s performance.
The problems with the governance structures of UNEP are ampliﬁed, moreover, by
the lack of more advanced administrative rules and procedures within the organization.

UNEP is a fairly transparent organization and promotes participation by
NGOs and business in its intergovernmental processes; however, it suffers
from deficient internal administrative controls — lack of oversight of staff,
limited enforcement of conflict of interest rules, etc. — leading to a per
ceived high degree of inefficiency, poor internal governance, and overall
lack of procedural legitimacy.78
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UNEP 1997a.

Exceptions include the
United States and Sweden,
which have specially appoint
ed Permanent Representatives, often with solid environmental backgrounds,
whose only responsibility is
to work with UNEP.
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See Najam 2003, arguing
that “UNEP has been denied
authority and resources.”
Konrad von Moltke explains,
“Given an impossible mission
and a derisory budget, UNEP
has slowly built an organiza
tion from program pieces,”
von Moltke 1996, p. 25.

UNEP’s limited ﬁnancial resources are the second primary reason analysts use to
explain UNEP’s ineffectiveness.79 UNEP’s annual budget of $215 million is indeed
miniscule compared to UNDP’s $3.2 billion80 and to EPA’s $7.8 billion.81 However, it
is larger than the budget of the WTO.82 Figure 5 compares the annual budgets of sev
eral major international organizations and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency.
83

UNDP’s budget for 2003.
http://www.undp.org/annu
alreports/2004/english/IAR0
4E.pdf. Accessed August
2005.
EPA’s budget for 2005
http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/bu
dget/2005/2005bib.pdf. More
annual budget documents
can be found at http://www.
epa.gov/ocfo/budget/.
Accessed August 2005.
For a breakdown of the WTO's
budget for 2004, see
http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/secre_e/budget
04_e.htm. Accessed August
2005.
The GEF budget in Figure 5
was estimated from the $3
billion in replenishment
funds in 2003 used for its
work program over a fouryear period. The WTO figure
only accounts for its
Secretariat’s operations, since
the WTO does not execute
any projects of its own. The
WHO budget information is
from http://www.who.int/
gb/e/e_ppb2003.html.
Accessed August 2005. The
OECD budget information
appears at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/34/6/34711139.
pdf. Accessed August 2005.
Based on UNEP 2004c and
the analysis of “UNEP
Environment Fund contribu
tions by donor countries” in
late 2004 by the Yale
research team.

Figure 5 Comparative Organizational Annual Budgets
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While the disparity in resources is striking, the nominal sum of the budget is a
symptom of the problem. The root cause of UNEP’s problems is the organization’s
unique ﬁnancial structure.

Unlike other international organizations whose budgets are based on pre
dictable mandatory assessed contributions, UNEP is completely dependent
on the voluntary contributions of individual states.
Only a dozen countries have regularly made annual contributions to the
Environment Fund since its inception in 1973.84 This unreliable and highly
discretionary ﬁnancial arrangement allows for individual donors to dictate UNEP’s
priorities, which has resulted in a fragmentation of UNEP’s activities and a lack of
clear prioritization. Furthermore, UNEP’s ﬁnancial stability, ability to plan beyond

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

limiting factors

the current budget cycle, and autonomy are compromised, thus instilling a riskaverse attitude within the organization’s leadership.
In the past ten years, contributions to the Environment Fund have dropped 36%
and have decreased in real terms since the 1970s and 1980s. Contributions to trust
funds and earmarked funds directing UNEP into speciﬁc activities, on the other
hand, have increased dramatically. The proportion of restricted ﬁnancing now com
prises more than two-thirds of UNEP’s revenue as shown in Figure 6.85
Figure 6 Total UNEP Biennial Income from 1973 to 2003 in Real 2000 US Dollars
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by the Yale research team
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provided by UNEP.
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This illustrates two important aspects that explain the political dynamics and con
sequences for UNEP’s performance. First, the decline in contributions to the
Environment Fund – the central ﬁnancial mechanism at the discretion of the
Secretariat – shows that conﬁdence in UNEP has diminished. The Secretariat is being
deprived of power to initiate and carry out programs it deems necessary and urgent.
The second key trend – a three-fold increase in overall funding since the 1980s,
including trust funds, earmarked contributions, and other revenues – shows recog
nition of the need for international mechanisms and UNEP in particular in address
ing environmental concerns.
The diversiﬁcation trend in ﬁnancial contributions is clearly illustrated in Figure
7, which depicts funding from the top ﬁve donors to UNEP: the United States (his
torically the top donor), Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. For all
these countries, contributions have shifted from the Environment Fund to other ear
marked mechanisms and are now roughly equal between the two.

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

36

rethinking unep

Figure 7 Top 5 Donor Contributions to UNEP
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Over the past few years under the leadership of Executive Director Klaus Töpfer, a
voluntary indicative scale of contributions was instituted. This mechanism provides
an expected level of ﬁnancial contribution based on the size of a country’s economy
and has signiﬁcantly broadened the number of donors.
In 2003, over 100 countries contributed to UNEP – twice as many as in the mid
1990s. A number of countries have also increased their contributions compared to the
mid-1990s. Canada’s contributions to the Environment Fund, for example, increased
from a record low of $662,000 (USD) in 1997 to almost $2 million in 2004. Canada
contributed over $1 million from 1994 through 1996 during the tenure of Executive
Director Elizabeth Dowdeswell, a Canadian national. However, the record giving took
place in 1977 when Canada contributed $2.5 million (about $6 million in 2000 dol
lars). Canada’s indicative scale of contribution for 2004-2005 amounts to only $1.7
million. Although praised as a valuable ﬁnancial tool, the indicative scale of contri
butions may, however, be doing a disservice to the organization.
Several countries are easily meeting their ﬁnancial targets and have no incentive to
contribute more. Bulgaria, for example, paid its $6,000 voluntary assessed contribu
tion in 2003 and 2004 but contributed over $20,000– more than 3 times as much –
in 1990. Mozambique’s contribution to UNEP as recently as 1998 totaled $10,000,
while the assessed contribution the country is currently paying amounts to only
$600. Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Austria, Australia, Kenya, Japan, Hungary, China, and
many others face similar circumstances.86
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location
The decision to locate UNEP in Nairobi was neither a “strategic necessity without
which developing countries might have never accepted an environmental organ to be
created”87 nor a way to marginalize the organization and “cannibalize its mandate.”88
It was not ill intended, premeditated, or the result of a secret bargain. Quite the oppo
site; it was the outcome of an open ballot vote at the General Assembly in November
1972.

87

88

Solidarity among developing countries, which outnumbered developed
countries by far, led to the establishment of the first international organi
zation in the developing world. The decision was openly political, seeking to
affirm the role of developing countries as equal partners in multilateral
affairs.

Najam 2003, p.374.
von Moltke 1996, p.54. von
Moltke asserts, “Lacking
enthusiastic supporters,
UNEP’s mandate was canni
balized. The principal means
of achieving this goal was to
provide limited funds divided
between a minimal institu
tional budget and a modest
‘Fund’, to assign it a ‘catalyt
ic’ function, and to locate it
away from the decision-mak
ing centres of the UN sys
tem.”

UNEP’s location has inﬂuenced the organization signiﬁcantly. Its ability to effec
tively coordinate and catalyze environmental action has been inhibited by its geo
graphical isolation from other relevant UN operations, inadequate long-distance
communication and transportation infrastructure, and lack of sufﬁcient face-to-face
interaction with counterparts in other agencies and treaty secretariats. Map 2 illus
trates the global clustering of key international organizations working on environ
ment-related activities by highlighting “hotspots” of activity.
89

Map 2 Density of International Organizations Working on Environment-Related Issues
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UNEP’s headquarters are located far outside the dense political activity “hotspots,”
posing a challenge to its ability to fulﬁll the coordination role speciﬁed in its mandate.
UNEP’s ofﬁces in Paris, New York, and Geneva, however, have tried to step into a liai
son-building role. Their “proximity to other organizations and important govern
ments seems to make these programs among the brighter lights of UNEP achieve
ment.”90
It is important to note that this spatial analysis of hotspots is focused particularly
on UNEP’s coordination function, and that for other aspects of UNEP’s mandate –
such as capacity building – the location may present an opportunity rather than a
challenge. A demand for greater operational responsibilities for UNEP has emerged
both from the developing world and from the organization’s staff. UNEP’s expertise
in institution building, for example, is greatly needed in Africa, and a survey of UNEP
staff indicates a desire of many in the organization to make on-the-ground impact in
developing countries.91 Pressing environmental challenges may demand immediate
on-the-ground action, but this is a mandate that UNEP does not possess.
The most important consequence of UNEP’s location is the inability to attract and
retain top-notch staff with the policy expertise and experience necessary to make the
organization the leading authority in the environmental ﬁeld. Nairobi is not neces
sarily a desirable location for staff with the expertise and management qualities that
UNEP needs. The increasingly treacherous security situation exacerbates this prob
lem.92 In addition, the remoteness of UNEP has required frequent travel by the
Executive Director and many senior staff, imposing a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial burden, but
most importantly, creating a leadership vacuum due to prolonged absences from
Nairobi. Effective management of the organization requires that the leadership be
present and responsive to staff needs and organizational priorities.

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

conclusions and recommendations

39

Conclusions and Recommendations
Five key problems beleaguer the current system for global environmental governance:
incoherence, inefﬁciency, information inadequacy, inequity, and insufﬁcient fund
ing.93 Although radical reform may indeed be urgently needed to address these key
problems, it seems unlikely to transpire. Political emphasis is increasingly being
placed on working within existing institutions rather than attempting bold new
designs. As Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan urged in his 2005 report In Larger Freedom,
“[i]t is now high time to consider a more integrated structure for environmental stan
dard-setting, scientiﬁc discussion and monitoring treaty compliance. This should be
built on existing institutions, such as the United Nations Environment Programme,
as well as the treaty bodies and specialized agencies.”94

Yet, a much stronger global voice and conscience for the global environ
ment is necessary in the form of an accountable, legitimate, and effective
anchor institution.
UNEP has a clear mandate to perform the anchor role for the global environment,
but has done so with only partial success. It has been relatively effective in two key
areas – monitoring and assessment and launching policy processes for environmental
agreements. It has also often served as the only international partner of frequently
marginalized environment ministries in many countries and provided a critical
forum where they can meet their counterparts.
However, UNEP has largely fallen short in managing policy processes in a coher
ent and coordinated fashion. It has failed to establish itself as the institutional home
for the numerous international environmental conventions. Without a center of grav
ity, the system of international environmental governance has grown increasingly
complex and fragmented. UNEP’s inability to fulﬁll its leadership role is compound
ed by shortsighted budget considerations, attractive offers by countries eager to host
new treaty secretariats, and by indifference at the highest political levels to the struc
ture of global environmental governance.
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs –
France 2005.

United Nations 2005, para
212.
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At the core of this dynamic, however, lies a key set of structural decisions. Contrary
to popular belief among environmental professionals, UNEP was not deliberately set
up as a weak and ineffective institution, but rather was expected to grow into its man
date as it proved its effectiveness.
Four structural choices, while considered right at the time of UNEP’s creation,
have inhibited UNEP’s performance and growth.
First, UNEP’s authority has been severely constrained by its status as a Programme
rather than Specialized Agency within the UN system.
Second, UNEP’s governance structure had led to more attention to the needs and
demands of member states than to the mission of the organization.
Third, UNEP’s ﬁnancing structure has enabled countries to pursue their own
interests through UNEP rather than the common good.
Fourth, UNEP’s physical distance from the centers of political activity has affected
its capacity to coordinate numerous environment-related agencies as well as, most
importantly, its ability to attract top-tier policy staff.
Nevertheless, UNEP offers a potentially strong comparative advantage in
environmental monitoring, scientiﬁc assessment, and information sharing that
should be developed and utilized fully. It is the natural forum for the creation of a
coherent international system for environmental monitoring, assessment,
information, and analysis. However, UNEP can no longer aspire to the lead role for
every environmental issue since expertise within the system has been diffused over
the past thirty years with the proliferation of other international organizations and
non-governmental organizations in the environmental arena. Instead, UNEP could
effectively lay the foundation for a policy forum where various clusters of agencies
and networks convene to negotiate and exchange experience. Its leadership in the
Environmental Management Group could create the policy space for such an
initiative. A more strategic, prioritized, and long-term capacity development
approach, drawing on UNEP’s comparative advantage as an information
clearinghouse and a policy forum, rather than an operational agency, could facilitate
the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements.
The initiative by the French and German governments to create a United Nations
Environment Organization may provide the impetus for a restructuring of the sys
tem. Simply upgrading UNEP into a United Nations Environment Organization
(UNEO), however, will not sufﬁce.
Reform efforts should focus on are how well UNEP has performed these functions,
underlying factors for its performance, and how any new organization would signif
icant improve on the current system. Unfortunately, current institutional reform pro
posals do not substantially depart from the existing UNEP mandate. Table 1 compares
the functions of UNEP and the proposed UNEO as anchor institutions.
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Table 1 Comparison of How UNEP and Proposed UNEO Might Fulfill Functions of Anchor Institution
ANCHOR INSTITUTION FUNCTON

UNEP

95

UNEO

96

95

Monitoring and
Assessment
●
●

●
●

Data and Indicators
Monitoring and
Veriﬁcation
Assessment
Information Reporting and
Exchange

●

●

Keep under review
the world environ
mental situation.
Provide policy advice,
early warning infor
mation on environ
mental threats, and to
catalyze and promote
international cooper
ation and action,
based on the best sci
entiﬁc and technical
capabilities available.

●

Promote international
cooperation in the ﬁeld of
environment and recom
mend policies to this end.
Provide advisory services
for the promotion of inter
national environmental
cooperation.
Bring up any matter that
requires consideration by
the Governing Council.
Develop international envi
ronmental law.
Coordinate environmental
programs within the
United Nations system,
keep their implementation
under review and assess
their effectiveness.

●

Provide policy and adviso
ry services in key areas of
institution-building to gov
ernments and other insti
tutions.
Advance implementation of
agreed international norms
and policies and stimulate
cooperative action.

●

●

Monitor and provide early
warning on the state of the
environment.
Provide information, facili
tate communication, and
mobilize stakeholders.

Agenda Setting and Policy
Processes
●
●

●
●

Goal and Priority Setting
Rulemaking and Norm
Development
Coordination
Dispute Settlement

●

●

●

●

●

●

Provide a political platform
for international legal and
strategic frameworks.
Improve coherence and
coordination, including the
convergence of norms,
implementation of interna
tional obligations and
ﬁnancing.

Capacity Development
●
●
●
●

Education and Training
Financing
Technical Assistance
Institution and Network
Building

●

●

●

Undertake capacity build
ing within developing and
transition countries.
Strengthen regional gover
nance.
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Mandated functions as elab
orated in GA Resolution 2997
and Nairobi Declaration.
See Ministry of Foreign
Affairs - France 2005 and
Tarasofsky and Hoare 2004.
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Reform should be multifaceted and layered, focusing on the core functions
of effective global environmental governance and devising appropriate
institutional arrangements. In some cases, it will build on existing frame
works, in others, new approaches may need to be developed.

policy options for governments and the united
nations secretary-general
Although a strategic overhaul of global environmental governance and the strength
ening of UNEP as an anchor institution are necessary, political viability limits what
palpable reform can be undertaken. However, governments and the United Nations
Secretary-General can initiate reforms that are far-reaching, yet build on existing
institutional successes, improve on organizational weaknesses, and address limiting
factors. This report makes the following recommendations:
●

Launch a Comprehensive Assessment of Global Environmental Governance

Any reform of global environmental governance needs to be based on a holistic
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses in the current system and the
effectiveness of UNEP in fulﬁlling its core mission as an anchor institution. A
comprehensive evaluation of the system of global environmental governance
would help to clarify the mandates of the numerous existing organizations,
including those with explicit environmental mandates such as the
environmental conventions, CSD, and GEF, as well as to reveal their comparative
advantages and provide a vision for reduced competition and a more productive
division of labor. This broad assessment should be undertaken with the goal of
producing an analytically sound and politically visionary set of recommen
dations on how to strengthen global environmental governance. It should
elaborate a substantive vision, including priority issues to be addressed and ways
to do so. The United Nations Secretary-General could initiate such an
assessment. The assessment would also provide a replicable template for similar
assessments of the institutional arrangements for other global public goods and
help lay a solid foundation for UN reform.
●

Create a Global Environmental Information Clearinghouse

While data gathering should primarily be the function of national organiza
tions, a central body to establish data protocols and a repository for compre
hensive and comprehensible information is necessary. A common data portal
with policy relevant information and analysis will reduce information overload
and improve problem understanding, generate political attention, and motivate
national action. A Global Commons Monitoring Report could be developed on
the basis of the consolidated data, providing a public account of global com
mons health as well as indicators for country and institutional performance in
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environmental sustainability. It would directly contribute to the broader Global
Public Goods (GPG) Monitoring Report suggested by the Secretariat of the
International Task Force on Global Public Goods.97
Scientific assessments, monitoring and early warning are UNEP’s major
strengths and could provide the foundation for an effective global information
clearinghouse. UNEP’s current administrative, managerial, scientiﬁc, and ﬁnan
cial capacity, however, needs to be enhanced. This would require a coherent
strategy, a clear action plan over a multi-year period, and substantial invest
ment. It would require that UNEP expand the number of staff involved in this
function (currently about 30) with an eye toward top quality expertise and at
least double the $16 million annual budget of the Division of Early Warning and
Assessment. The newly proposed Environment Watch framework, which aims
to create a coherent conceptual framework for UNEP’s environmental assess
ment activities, should be assessed carefully in this context.98 If the concept is
feasible to implement and shows promise, it should indeed be developed further
into a functioning global environmental information clearinghouse.
●
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98

Create a Global Environmental Capacity Clearinghouse

Disparate activities of the numerous multilateral and bilateral agencies have
come to drain rather than enhance national capacity. A consolidated source of
information on capacity building for environmental governance needs to be
created – tracking and planning technical assistance activities, matching the
“supply” with the “demand” for services, and highlighting best practices on a
wide range of projects. The capacity clearinghouse would make international
agencies more efﬁcient and effective, provide a trusted source of information on
needs and capabilities to donor countries, and ensure a higher quality and quan
tity of aid to recipient countries. Drawing on the comparative strengths of both
operational (UNDP and the World Bank) and normative (UNEP) agencies as
well as on the expertise and resources of the GEF, it could link up to the pro
posed GPG Financing Framework.99 The institutional home for this mechanism
needs to be chosen with care based on comparative advantage, authority, and
legitimacy.
The Environmental Management Group in Geneva is one possible host, provid
ed that it is endowed with the necessary internal capabilities. The EMG has
focused on capacity building in the course of 2004 in its interagency coordina
tion efforts and could build further on this initiative. It could begin by estab
lishing a comprehensive database of capacity building needs and resources.
UNEP could add signiﬁcant value by providing systematic assessment and pri
oritization of country needs as well as systematic cataloguing and evaluation of
resources offered by international agencies and governments. UNEP’s key role
would be to act as the environmental conscience in the system stimulating
action within its sister agencies. It could also provide direct capacity-building
services in areas where it has a comparative advantage such as the strengthening
of national environmental institutions.
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Global Public Goods
Secretariat 2005.

UNEP is currently developing
Environment Watch, “a system for improved monitoring
of the globe’s environment
which will also strengthen
links between researchers
and policymakers.” UNEP
2005c.
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●

100

101

102

103

104

The premise for institutional clustering is based on the notion that a combined
effort of agencies according to their comparative advantage will produce greater
results than the smaller fragmented and often competing efforts of individual
organizations.100 Positive environmental results are more likely to be attained if
unproductive duplication of effort is reduced, synergies are captured, and scarce
resources are pooled. A clustering effort is at heart a coordination approach and
requires three core capacities in the anchor institution: (1) legitimacy through
expertise, results, and procedural fairness; (2) top quality communication abili
ty and location at the center of political activity; and (3) a system of incentives
(ﬁnancial as well as reputational). In the contemporary context of institutional
proliferation, it is imperative that expertise and resources are pooled together
under the lead of one or two expert institutions. One approach would be to have
different agencies take the initiative in certain issue areas and form clusters
around biodiversity, climate change, ﬁsheries, desertiﬁcation, for example, or
other existing and emerging issues.

El-Ashry 2004, von Moltke
2001a, 2001c.

In the ﬁrst decade of its operations, UNEP did in fact serve as a lead agency in
forming such clusters through thematic joint programming with other agen
cies.101 However, success was not lasting due to the discrepancies in the budget
cycles of the organizations involved, the scattering of resources, and the remote
ness of UNEP, which inhibits the regular meetings and informal get-togethers
that are the sinews of coordination.102 Coordination efforts within GEF and UN
AIDS have had better results.103 While considerable challenges remain, GEF has
performed relatively well as a “networked institution” due to its ample funding
for other agencies, top quality staff expertise and communication ability, as well
as its location in proximity to the major donors. On the other hand, though UN
AIDS has “well established itself as a leader and center of knowledge . . . and has
made signiﬁcant achievements in advocacy, policy consensus . . . and coordina
tion,” it has been greatly constrained by the lack of incentives for the core par
ticipating agencies to develop a genuinely integrated approach.104

Joint Programming brought
together the Designated
Officials on Environmental
Matters three times a year in
addition to periodic meet
ings among those in a cer
tain “cluster.” This process
was “beginning to resemble
comprehensive UN planning
in program and resource dis
tribution.” Eastby 1984, p.
241.

Eastby 1984, p. 241-3.
GEF 2005 and UN AIDS
2003.
UNAIDS 2003.

Cluster Institutions

policy options for unep
Though it is ultimately governments that need to take the initiative to institute the
above reforms, there are several steps that UNEP itself can take to enhance its role as
the leading global environmental authority. They range from smaller-scale immedi
ate efforts, such as improved ﬁnancial reporting, to broader initiatives, such an exter
nal strategic review.
●

Initiate an Independent Strategic Review of UNEP’s Role

An independent strategic review of UNEP should examine UNEP’s role and
performance within the global environmental governance system. In conjunc
tion with the comprehensive assessment described in the previous section, such
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conclusions and recommendations

a review should systematically assess the history and performance of the organ
ization, outline current and future needs and trends, and deﬁne scenarios for
action based on sound assessment of progress to date, constraints, and oppor
tunities. It would facilitate a transition to more accountable leadership and
improvement in key management practices. Several international organizations
have performed regular evaluations of their own performance. GEF, for exam
ple, has undergone three external evaluations in its 14-year life. The
Performance Studies are commissioned by the GEF Council to “assess the extent
to which GEF has achieved, or is on its way towards achieving its main objec
tives, as laid down in the GEF Instrument and subsequent decisions by the GEF
Council and the Assembly.”105 For UN AIDS, the essence of the Five-Year
Evaluation was also to determine the extent to which the Joint Programme was
meeting expectations on issues surrounding the HIV/AIDS epidemic and on the
coordination of the United Nations inter-agency collaborative response.106
UNEP’s Executive Director should initiate a similar strategic review of the
organization and request that an independent commission be established for
this purpose to undertake the task.
●
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See http://thegef.org/
MonitoringandEvaluation/
MEPublications/MEPOPS/
OPS3_Interim_Report_2
15_v2.pdf. Accessed August
2005.

UNAIDS 2003.

Consolidate Financial Accounting and Reporting

Comprehensive and clear ﬁnancial reporting is critical to building and main
taining the conﬁdence of donors. While UNEP keeps good track of funding
sources by individual and aggregated formats, its expenditures are not reported
in a consolidated fashion. Expenditure reports should indicate expenditures in
terms of mandated functions – capacity building, information, coordination,
catalyzing – as well as by individual environmental issues so that members
states and donors can understand how UNEP as a whole is expending money
and effort.
●

Restructure Organizational Governance

Currently, UNEP’s Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environmental
Forum (GC/GMEF) performs both of the governance functions UNEP needs:
providing leadership to international environmental governance and overseeing
UNEP’s program and budget. Performing both roles leads to circumscribed
leadership and circular decision making in which programs and budget drive
priorities and strategies rather than global needs. If UNEP is to live up to its
mandated leadership role, an inclusive structure like the Global Ministerial
Environment Forum is required to review global issues, assess global needs and
spot gaps, identify global priorities, and develop strategies to address priorities.
The internal oversight role is best performed by a smaller, more efﬁcient body
with greater discipline and focus on the program of work, budget, management
oversight, and program evaluation. This report recommends the creation of an
Executive Board of no more than 20 members, comprising – if committed to
innovation – representatives of both member states and civil society.
Membership on the board should be rotating and ensure regional representation.107
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For a detailed discussion of
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2004.
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This would entail the elimination or restructuring of the Committee of
Permanent Representatives and the 58-member Governing Council. While
politically challenging, such a restructuring is fundamental to effective reform.
The leadership of governments will be critical in this task.

108

In designing a new global environmental architecture, form should follow func
tion. The institutional recommendations proposed in this report need not add
a new layer of international bureaucracy. Quite to the contrary, they entail con
solidation of the existing panoply of international environmental institutions
and a shift toward a more modern “virtual” environmental regime. A multi
stage approach is envisioned, building on the strengths of current institutions
(and especially on UNEP as an anchor), addressing weaknesses, and creating
innovative arrangements where necessary.108 Table 2 summarizes these recom
mendations to the UN Secretary-General, to governments, and to UNEP.

See Esty and Ivanova 2002a.

Table 2 Recommendations

United Nations Secretary-General
●

Launch a comprehensive assessment of the global environmental governance
system
UNEP

Governments
●

●

●

Create a global environmental
information clearinghouse within
UNEP
Create a global environmental
capacity clearinghouse
Cluster institutions

●

●

●

Initiate an independent strategic
review
Consolidate ﬁnancial accounting
and reporting
Restructure organizational gover
nance

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

works cited

Works Cited
Andresen, Steinar. 2001. Global Environmental Governance: UN Fragmentation and
Co-Ordination. In Yearbook of International Co-Operation on Environment and
Development, edited by O. S. Stokke and O. B. Thommessen. London: Earthscan
Publications.
Bernstein, Steven, and Maria Ivanova. Forthcoming. Fragmentation and
Compromise in Global Environmental Governance. In Global Governance, edit
ed by S. Bernstein and L. W. Pauly. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Biermann, Frank. 2000. The Case for a World Environment Organization.
Environment 42 (9):22-31.
_____. 2001. The Emerging Debate on the Need for a World Environment
Organisation: A Commentary. Global Environmental Politics 1 (1):45-55.
_____. 2002a. Green Global Governance: The Case for a World Environment
Organisation. New Economy 9 (2):82-86.
_____. 2002b. Strengthening Green Global Governance in a Disparate World Society:
Would a World Environment Organisation Beneﬁt the South? International
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2):297–315.
Biermann, Frank, and Steffen Bauer. 2004. Does Effective International
Environmental Governance Require a World Environment Organization? The
State of the Debate Prior to the Report of the High-Level Panel on Reforming the
United Nations. In Global Governance Working Paper Nr. 13. Amsterdam, Berlin,
Oldenburg, Potsdam: The Global Governance Project.
_____. 2005. A World Environment Organization: Solution or Threat for Effective
International Environmental Governance? Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Campbell, Piers, and Judith Hushagen. 2002. The Governance of Inter-Governmental
Organisations. Corporate Governance 2 (1):23.
Charnovitz, Steve. 2002. A World Environment Organization. Columbia Journal of
Environmental Law 27 (323):323-362.
Conca, Ken. 1995. Greening the United Nations: Environmental Organisations and
the UN System. Third World Quarterly 16 (3):441-457.
Desai, Bharat. 2001. Coming Out of Coma. Down to Earth. March 15.
_____. 2004. Institutionalizing International Environmental Law. Ardsley, New York:
Transnational Publishers.

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

47

48

rethinking unep

Eastby, John Hiatt. 1984. David Mitrany’s Approach to Politics: Functionalism in
Theory and Practice. PhD Thesis, University of Virginia.
El-Ashry, Mohamed. 2004. Mainstreaming the Environment–Coherence among
International Governance Systems. Paper read at International Environmental
Governance Conference, Institute of Sustainable Development and International
Relations, in Paris. Available at http://www.iddri.org/iddri/telecharge/gie/com
mnications/4e_elashry.pdf. Accessed on August 2005.
Esty, Daniel C. 1994. The Case for a Global Environmental Organization. In Managing
the World Economy: Fifty Years after Bretton Woods, edited by P. B. Kenen.
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
_____. 2000. International Governance at the Global Level: The Value of Creating a
Global Environmental Organization. Environment Matters Annual Review 1999
2000:12-15.
_____. 2005 (forthcoming). Toward Good Global Governance: The Role of
Administrative Law. Yale Law Journal 115.
Esty, Daniel C., and Maria Ivanova. 2002a. Revitalizing Global Environmental
Governance: A Function-Driven Approach. In Global Environmental Governance:
Options and Opportunities, edited by D. Esty and M. Ivanova. New Haven, CT:
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies.
_____, eds. 2002b. Global Environmental Governance: Options & Opportunities. New
Haven, CT: Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies.
Esty, Daniel C., Marc A. Levy, Tanja Srebotnjak, and Alexander de Sherbinin. 2005.
2005 Environmental Sustainability Index: Benchmarking National Environmental
Stewardship. New Haven, CT: Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy.
Forss, Kim. 2004. Strengthening the Governance of UNEP: A Discussion of Reform
Issues: Paper commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden.
GEF. 2005 GEF Third Overall Performance Study. Available at http://thegef.org/
MonitoringandEvaluation/MEOngoingEvaluations/MEOOPS3/meoops3.html.
Accessed August 2005.
_____. 2000. Introduction to the GEF. Available at http://www.gefweb.org/
Site_Index/GEF_Intro_to_GEF.pdf. Accessed August 2005.
Haas, Peter M. 2004. Addressing the Global Governance Deficit. Global
Environmental Politics 4 (4):1-15.
Haas, Peter M., Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy. 1993. Institutions for the Earth
Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Hamer, Mick. 2002. The Filthy Rich. New Scientist 173 (2324):7.
Head, John W. 1978. Challenge of International Environmental Management: A
Critique of the United Nations Environment Programme. Virginia Journal of
International Law 18 (2):269-288.
Imber, Mark F. 1993. Too Many Cooks? The Post-Rio Reform of the United Nations.
International Affairs 69 (1):55-70.

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

works cited

International Task Force on Global Public Goods Secretariat. 2005. Strategy and
Actions for Meeting Global Challenges: International Cooperation in the
National Interest, Draft Working Paper: Secretariat of the International Task
Force on Global Public Goods.
Ivanova, Maria. 2005. Environment: The Path of Global Environmental Governance –
Form and Function in Historical Perspective. In Governance for Sustainable
Development: A Foundation for the Future, edited by G. Ayre and R. Callway.
London: Earthscan.
Kanie, Norichika, and Peter M. Haas, eds. 2004. Emerging Forces in Environmental
Governance. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – France. 2005. Transforming the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) into a United Nations Environment
Organization (UNEO): Informal Working Group – Progress Report.
Najam, Adil. 2001. Vision 2020: Towards Better Global Governance. In 2020 Global
Architecture Visions Conference. University of Victoria, Canada: Centre for Global
Studies.
_____. 2003. The Case against a New International Environmental Organization.
Global Governance 9 (3):367.
Petsonk, Carol A. 1990. The Role of The United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) in the Development of International Environmental Law. American
University Journal of International Law and Policy 5 (31): 351-391.
Ruggiero, Renato. 1998. A Global System for the Next Fifty Years. In Address to the
Royal Institute of International Affairs. London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs.
Runge, C. Ford. 2001. A Global Environmental Organization (GEO) and the World
Trading System. Journal of World Trade 35 (4):399-426.
Rydbeck, Olof. 1972. Statement by Ambassador Olof Rydbeck in the Preparatory
Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Fourth Session. New York: Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations.
Shakow, Alexander. 2004. Review of GPG Anchor Institutions. September 2004: Draft
Paper prepared for the International Task Force on Global Public Goods (revised
version forthcoming).
Speth, James Gustave. 2002. The Global Environmental Agenda: Origins and
Prospects. In Global Environmental Governance: Options & Opportunities, edited
by D. C. Esty and M. Ivanova. New Haven, CT: Yale School of Forestry &
Environmental Studies.
_____. 2003. Worlds Apart: Globalization and the Environment. Washington, D.C.:
Island Press.
_____. 2004. Red Sky at Morning. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Tarasofsky, Richard G., and Alison L. Hoare. 2004. Implications of a UNEO for the
Global Architecture of the International Environmental Governance System.
Paris: Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations.

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

49

50

rethinking unep

Töpfer, Klaus. 2002. Agenda Item 87: Environment and Sustainable Development.
Speech made by Dr. Klaus Töpfer at the 57th Session of the General Assembly,
Second Committee. Available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/
Default.Print.asp?DocumentID=273&ArticleID=3169&l=en. Accessed August
2005.
UNAIDS. 2003. HIV/AIDS: Addressing the Recommendations of the UNAIDS FiveYear Evaluation. Available at http://www.undp.org/execbrd/word/UNAIDS
%205-year%20Evaluation.doc. Accessed August 2005.
UNEP. 1997a. Governing Council Decision 19/32: Governance of the United Nations
Environment Programme. Available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.
Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=96&ArticleID=1456&l=en. Accessed
August 2005.
_____. 1997b. Nairobi Declaration on the Role and Mandate of UNEP
(UNEP/Gc19/1/1997). Adopted during the Nineteenth Session of the Governing
Council: Available at http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?Document
ID=287&ArticleID=1728. Accessed August 2005.
_____. 2001a. Multilateral Environment Agreements: Summary (UNEP/IGM/
1/INF/1). Open-ended Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or Their
Representatives on International Environmental Governance First Meeting, New
York, 18 April 2001.
_____. 2001b. Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or Their
Representatives on International Environmental Governance: Report of the
Chair (UNEP/IGM/3/3). 3rd meeting. 9-10 September 2001: Available at
http://www1.unep.org/meas/igm3x3.doc. Accessed August 2005.
_____. 2004a. Global Environment Outlook (GEO): SWOT Analysis and Evaluation
of the GEO-3 Process from the Perspective of GEO Collaborating Centres.
Available at http://www.unep.org/geo/pdfs/SWOT.pdf. Accessed August 2005.
_____. 2004b. Global Environmental Outlook: User Proﬁle and Impact Study.
Available at http://www.unep.org/geo/pdfs/GEO-UserProfileandImpactStudy.
pdf. Accessed August 2005.
_____. 2004c. Resource Mobilization, Environment Fund. Available at http://www.
unep.org/rmu/en/Financing_environmentfund.htm. Accessed August 2005.
_____. 2005a. Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity Building.
Available at http://www.unep.org/GC/GC23/documents/GC23-6-add-1.pdf.
Accessed August 2005.
_____. 2005b. Environment Fund Budgets: Proposed Biennial Programme and
Support Budget for 2006–2007; Report of the Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions; State of the Environment and
Contribution of the United Nations Environment Programme in Addressing
Substantive Environmental Challenges: Report of the Executive Director.
Available at http://www.unep.org/GC/GC23/documents/GC23-8.pdf. Accessed
August 2005.

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

works cited

_____. 2005c. State of the Environment and Contribution of the United Nations
Environment Programme to Addressing Substantive Environmental Challenges:
Report of the Executive Director (UNEP/GC.23/3). Nairobi: Available at
http://www.unep.org/GC/GC23/documents/GC23-3.pdf. Accessed August 2005.
_____. 2005d. Synthesis of Responses on Strengthening the Scientiﬁc Base of the
United Nations Environment Programme: (UNEP/SI/IGC/2).
UNEP, and Environmental Management Group. Environmental Management Group
2005. Available at http://www.unemg.org. Accessed August 2005.
United Nations. 1972a. General Assembly Resolution 2977 (XXVII): Institutional and
Financial Arrangements for International Environmental Cooperation. Available
at http://www.unep.org/PDF/UN_GA_2997.pdf. Accessed August 2005.
_____. 1972b. International Organizational Implications of Action Proposals
(A/CONF.48/11). 10 January 1972.
_____. 1993. Agenda Item 79: Institutional Arrangements to Follow up the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (A/RES/47/191).
Available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/ares47-191.htm. Accessed
August 2005.
_____. 1997. Review of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and
the Administrative Practices of Its Secretariat, Including the United Nations
Ofﬁce in Nairobi (UNON). Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of
the Ofﬁce of Internal Oversight Services (A/51/810).
_____. 1998. Agenda Item 30: Environment and Human Settlements – Report of the
Secretary General (A/53/463). October 6, 1998, 53rd Session.
_____. 2005. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights
for All. In Report of the Secretary-General. Available at http://www.un.org/larger
freedom/. Accessed August 2005.
Vogler, John, and Mark Imber. 1996. The Environment and International Relations.
London; New York: Routledge.
von Moltke, Konrad. 1996. Why UNEP Matters. In Green Globe Yearbook 1996. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
_____. 2001a. On Clustering International Environmental Agreements. Winnipeg:
International Institute for Sustainable Development.
_____. 2001b. The Organization of the Impossible. Global Environmental Politics 1 (1):
23-28.
_____. 2001c. Whither MEAs? The Role of International Environmental Management
in the Trade and Environment Agenda. Winnipeg: International Institute for
Sustainable Development.

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

51

list of acronyms

List of Acronyms
Basel

CAR/RCU

CBD
CITES
CMS
CPR
CSD
DEWA
EF
EMG
EPA
ESI
FAO
GC
GEF
GEMS
GEO
GMEF
GPG
GRID
IAEA
ICAO
IFAD
ILO
IMCO
IMO
ITU

Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal
Convention for the Protection and Development
of the Marine Environment in the Wider
Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention)
Convention on Biological Diversity
Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Convention on Migratory Species
Committee of Permanent Representatives
Commission on Sustainable Development
Division of Early Warning and Assessment, UNEP
Environment Fund
Environmental Management Group
Environmental Protection Agency
Environmental Sustainability Index
Food and Agricultural Organization
Governing Council
Global Environment Facility
Global Environmental Monitoring System
Global Environmental Outlook
Global Ministerial Environment Forum
Global Public Goods
Global Resource Information Database
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Civil Aviation Organization
International Fund for Agricultural Development
International Labor Organization
International Maritime Consultative Organization
International Maritime Organisation
International Telecommunication Union
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JPO
MAP/RCU
MEAs
NGO
OCHA
OECD
Ramsar
UN
UNAIDS
UNCCD
UNCHS
UNCTAD
UNDCP
UNDESA
UNDP
UNEP
UNESCO
UNFCCC
UNFPA
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNIDO
UNITAR
UNRWA
UPU
WCMC
WFP
WHO
WIPO
WMO
WTO

Junior Professional Ofﬁcer
Mediterranean Action Plan – Barcelona
Convention
Multilateral Environmental Agreements
Nongovernmental Organizations
Ofﬁce for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands
United Nations
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertiﬁcation
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development
United Nations International Drug Control
Programme
United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Environment Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc, and
Cultural Organization
United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change
United Nations Population Fund
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Children’s Fund
United Nations Industrial Development
Organization
United Nations Institute for Training and
Research
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East
Universal Postal Union
World Conservation Monitoring Center
World Food Programme
World Health Organization
World Intellectual Property Organization
World Meteorological Organization
World Trade Organization
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